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The processes of legal and economic integration at a regional and global
scale have created powerful legal and economic dilemmas. They challenge
the paradigms of constitutionalism, including the State´s monopoly of
constitutionalism, the autonomy of national political communities and
the traditional forms of participation and representation. They also require
profound changes in the way in which we think and teach the law. The
phenomenon of globalisation has promoted the inter-dependence of
national political communities and destroyed the artificial boundaries
upon which national constitutional democracies are found and from
which derive their legitimacy. Many argue for the need to regulate such
process of globalization and subject the forces that command it to some
form of democratic control. Some conceive the developing forms of
regional integration as new forms of governance which attempt to provide
a regulatory and constitutional forum capable of controlling and
legitimising the process of economic integration and globalisation. They
can even be conceived as intermediary steps on the way to a global polity
that may take the constitutional form tested in these regional systems.
There are also those who propose far reaching models of democratisation
of the global community to be undertaken, for example, through profound
short and long-term reforms of the UN system. Finally, there are those
who conceive the process of globalisation itself as an instrument of
constitutional development and trust to principles such as free trade and
non-discrimination the leading role in developing such global or interna-
tional constitutionalism.
International trade law has taken a pivotal role in the discussions
surrounding the legal and political form of the international society and
in expressing the challenges brought by globalization to the State and its
constitutionalism. Economic integration and free trade generate
competition between the different national economic and legal systems.
There are different economic and legal analyses praising or criticising
such strategy of trade liberalization and its accompanying regulatory
competition. There are also those that defend that the concept of
competition among states itself is highly overstated and does not really
fits with the reality of international trade and its impact on national
economies. I will not be reviewing these different analyses in detail. I will
assume, in any case, the free trade is generating forms of inter-dependence
that, as I will explain, affect the constitutional autonomy of the different
political communities and, at the same time, promotes the emergence of
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a global political arena. There may be no doubt that, overall, free trade
promotes efficiency and wealth maximisation. But, it is also not clear that
all steps favouring free trade will produce more efficient or equitable
solutions on the basis of existing alternatives. My assumption, at this
point, is that whatever the final balance between regulatory and
deregulatory approaches for international trade, global economic
integration will develop inter-actions among the different national political
communities and individuals leading to some forms of constitutional
challenges on their degree of political self-determination. But, at the same
time, this will generate claims of inter-dependence and shared social
decisions. In other words, whatever the final framework for international
trade it will be decided in an emerging global political arena. One of the
aims of this essay is to identify this political arena, who governs it, and
according to which rules. A second aim will be to highlight the
constitutional nature of the challenge brought by international trade to
the different national political communities. It is also worth noting that
the development of international trade and economic integration will
raise claims for some form of global distributive justice to complement
the wealth maximisation arising from free trade. The gradual outcome
will be the developing of global forms of political discourse and law
making challenging State constitutionalism and requiring some of the
instruments and theories of constitutionalism.
1 – THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE CHALLENGE TO CONSTITU-
TIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION
The best way to identify the challenge of international trade to the
constitutional self-determination of national political communities is by
reconstructing the well known debate between free trade and fair trade
that is highlighted by the well known rhetoric of trade and human rights
and, notably, trade and social rights. The starting point of the free trade
vs. fair trade debate is the existence of different domestic social policies.
Free trade advocates argue that such social policy differences cannot be
used to restrict free trade. Fair trade advocates argue that free trade
should only take place if those different social policies do not distort trade
competition, therefore guaranteeing that free trade will not restrict the
freedom of the different political communities to adopt different social
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policies. In a context of free trade, the free circulation of companies,
capital, products and services generates a process of regulatory competition
among different polities: companies will move to where the regulatory
environment is more favourable to their objectives (deregulation, lower
taxes, financial incentives etc.); consumers, in turn, can choose among
goods and services conforming to different regulations. As a consequence,
regulations themselves will also be competing in the market. As stated
before, there are many different economic and legal analyses praising or
criticising such strategy of trade liberalization and its accompanying
regulatory competition. Free trade advocates stress the efficiency gains
derived from a better allocation of resources and the higher freedom of
choice and lower prices available for consumers. Fair trade advocates
point to the threat to the welfare State and the risks of a regulatory “race
to the bottom”: companies will move to States with lower environmental,
social, health or consumer standards and still benefit from the free trade
of their products and services. They argue that either the different
political communities should be authorised to restrict free trade if necessary
to protect their social standards or there should be a level playing field
whereby all parties participating in free trade will comply with a basic set
of social rights. Free trade advocates, in turn, will argue that to authorise
some countries to exclude trade from other countries on the basis of
non-compliance with the former social policies corresponds, in effect, to
authorise that country to impose its social policies on its trading partners
and, in many instances, to use those social policies as a cover for economic
protectionism. Furthermore, free trade economists normally argue that
the best harmonisation of social standards will be that arising ex-post
from the regulatory competition among the different social policies.
This summary of the predominant views of free trade and fair trade
advocates already highlights two main types of arguments present on
both sides of the debate: the first type of argument is based on the
restriction imposed by either free trade or fair trade proposals on the
freedom of some political communities to choose their own social policies
(what I call social self-determination); the second type of argument is
based upon the idea of fair competition which each side claims the other
undermines.
In reality both of these levels of friction arising from divergent social
policies in a context of free trade can be subsumed under the fear by the
different political communities of losing the constitutional autonomy of
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self-determining their social policies. The argument of unfair competition
is either instrumental to the problem of social self-determination or
requires, as the basis for the framing and discussion of free trade policy,
common global values and a degree of social solidarity which could only
exist in the context of a global political community. As things now stand
there is no basis for a political contract at the global level and, as a
consequence, the debate must focus on the best way to safeguard the
constitutional self-determination of the different political communities.
Fair traders say that free trade without a common level playing field
forces some political communities to lower their social standards in order
for their products and services to be competitive in the world market.
Free traders will argue that fair traders are simply trying to impose their
social standards on other countries by denying these countries access to
market competition if they do not conform to those social standards. Both
perspectives of unfair competition can therefore be reconstructed as
focusing on the challenges to the constitutional autonomy of different
political communities to exercise social self-determination and freely
choose their domestic policies.
Trade liberalisation and the expansion of the global market means that
more and more products and services from more and more States are
competing in the same market. That competition indirectly affects the
different regulatory frameworks to which those products are subject in
their country of origin. Free trade generates competition between the
different political communities’ economic and legal systems subject to the
goal of efficiency. Even if this economic competition is often highly
over-stated the reality is that their simple perception constrains the
normative autonomy of the different political communities. The extent to
which the WTO case-law already embodies a notion of free trade rights
as protecting the freedom of economic actors to choose among different
regulatory systems can be disputed. But, even if legally an obligation is
not imposed on countries to lower their social, environmental and
consumer standards, economic competition opens their regulatory systems
to competition and efficiency criteria, de facto subjecting normative ideals
to economic competition. This affects their political autonomy in
determining their social policies.
The debate on the social clause in the WTO context provides a good
example. Fair trade advocates have been arguing in the academic and
political debates in favour of some form of authorisation of non-discri-
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minatory restrictions on trade with respect to social standards or, in the
alternative, to establish minimum social standards to be complied with
by all contracting parties of the WTO in order to benefit from free trade.
However, all proposals favouring the establishment of a social clause in
the WTO legal framework have so far proved to be unacceptable for an
important number of States, mainly those whose comparative advantages
result in great part from their lower social standards. For these contracting
parties, the setting of a “level playing field” in the social sphere or the
requirement to comply with different non-discriminatory social standards
in order to be granted market access are seen as disguised forms of
protectionism once they either lead to prohibit the entrance into a national
market of products produced in accordance with different social standards
or deprive those products from their competitive advantage. Therefore,
those States would be forced to change their domestic social policies in
order to gain access to the market of States with different social policies.
In this way, fair trade policies can also be accused of affecting the
constitutional self-determination of some political communities.
Fair trade advocates are right in noting that free trade challenges the
autonomy of their political communities to determine their domestic
policies. The problem is that the solutions they propose also challenge the
autonomy of other political communities to determine their own policies.
To be truthful, social activists and fair trade advocates present other
arguments in favour of the conditionality of free trade upon certain social
rights and policies. These are arguments derived from the independent
value of social rights, which ought to be universally protected. The most
critical views of trade liberalization and globalization oppose what they
foresee as the subjection of regulatory ideals and human rights values to
the market forces. The paradox is that defenders of trade liberalization
and globalization see on this same process a tool for the promotion of
human rights and will argue that there is no natural incompatibility
between free trade and social rights. On the contrary, the economic
growth, freedom and inter-dependence generated by free trade may be
the more appropriate ground for the promotion of social rights. The key
to unveil the reasons for such paradox lies in the fact that the notion of
human rights is not enforceable in itself and requires a definition of the
content of those rights. Where free trade advocates and free trade oppo-
nents disagree is on the definition of who should define what those rights
are or, in alternative, on which definition of human rights should prevail.
International Trade and Constitutionalism: Friends or Enemies?
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The social rights rhetoric of fair trade advocates can only sustain itself if
fair trade advocates are able to justify why their understanding of social
rights should prevail over the different understanding of other political
communities. The usual explanation is circular but apparently effective:
such social rights are conceived as universal rights to be valid on all
political communities. Therefore, they do not correspond to the imposition
of the values of one political community over another but to values whose
claim of legitimacy arises from a universal source, independent of all
national and regional political communities. Such values and the rights
flowing from them would be found in a trans-national link between the
members of the different sub-global political communities. This
trans-national solidarity would entail a criterion of distributive justice
and fairness capable of legitimating uniform social rights. One may even
partially accept some form of political relation between the citizens of the
different sub-global political communities. However, such a theory of
legitimacy faces serious problems when used to justify the conditionality
of free trade upon the compliance by all countries with certain social
standards. The establishment of global social standards which surpass
the judgements of local political communities (State and regional such as
the EU) can only be properly legitimised if the independent universal
claim of legitimacy upon which they are based satisfies the conditions of
a political community with a certain degree of solidarity that can be
opposed to that of national or regional political communities. Many of the
social rights advocated by fair traders have costs which would have to be
shared by that global political community. If there is no global political
community willing to share such costs and to figure out a criterion of
distributive justice capable of supporting the application of those global
social rights, then there is no reason why one perception of what social
rights are should prevail over another. The same reasoning however does
not apply to rights with no such costs and which can be constructed as
necessary to the protection of constitutional self-determination.
At this point, what is clear is that what both sides of the free trade vs fair
trade debate assume is that their judgment on the best balance between
free trade and social rights ought to prevail. Since each side of the debate
does not accept the requirements of a broader political community
(including an agreement on a distributive justice criterion) the solution of
this conflict cannot be legitimately subject to some form of universal
criterion or global values (since there is no underlying global political
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community capable of legitimating it). Instead, the different balances
between free trade and social rights reflect themselves in different social
policies of the different political communities, all of which present an
a priori higher claim of legitimacy than that which can be provided by the
rhetoric of either free trade or social rights without an underlying political
community. It is on the conflicting judgments and claims of legitimacy of
the different political communities that the debate on free trade vs fair
trade must focus. Therein lies the real reason for the dispute.
Therefore, the problem of free trade and social policy is not about the
rhetoric or the values that ought to dominate globalisation and trade
liberalisation. There may actually be a world consensus on the protection
of social rights and the promotion of free trade but there is no overarching
consensus on the content of those rights and the rules of international
trade that ought to control the choice among different conceptions of the
social good. The real question to be faced concerns the choice of the
process or institution which will balance the legitimate claims of different
political communities to have their own judgments on the social good
protected and the extent to which this constitutional self-determination
of the different political communities ought and can be protected. It will
be more useful if, instead of focusing on a largely inoperative rhetoric of
human rights and globalisation, the debate would focus on the normative
constitutional criteria that ought to be followed in making those difficult
institutional choices.
2 – THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE CHALLENGE TO THE FORMS
OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
A meaningful debate on international trade must depart from a analysis
of the way in which free trade affects the constitutional definition of our
political communities and the extent to which States and other polities
(such as the EU) remain the primary form of expressing our individuals
interests and participating both in domestic and international
decision-making affecting social policies. Such analysis will highlight the
constitutional character of the challenges brought about by economic
integration which, in turn, will determine the criterion of legitimacy and
the architecture of the legal framework which will regulate the
developments promoted by economic integration and the nature of the
International Trade and Constitutionalism: Friends or Enemies?
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relation between trans-national, regional and national decision-making
processes. The constitutional relevance of international trade can be seen
in the impact it has on the constitutional self-determination of classical
political communities (mainly States). But it can also be conceived, in a
broader light, as giving rise to a change in the overall patterns of partici-
pation and representation in social decision-making. In this sense, it
challenges not only the exercise of constitutionalism at the State level but
also the conditions of constitutionalism in general.
Free trade gives raises to several constitutional phenomena, all of which
affect the traditional mechanisms of representation and participation and
the definition of the relevant political communities for constitutional
self-determination, giving rise to what we could call a constitutional
transformation of domestic political communities and discourse:
a) The New Political Fora of Policy-Making
Traditionally, international organizations could not be conceived
as affecting the conditions for the domestic political definition of
policy-making. International organizations were mainly set up to
reduce information and transaction costs and to provide the
necessary framework for viable cooperation among States since
this would be difficult to achieve without the institutionalised
processes provided for by those international organizations. The
application of this classical conception of international organizations
is highly problematic to organisations such as the WTO or, even,
the ILO. The legal norms and political process which rule over the
WTO end up attributing to it an independent normative authority.
Once international organizations are perceived by the different
social actors as emerging forms of independent power, they will
attempt to profit from these organizations to pursue their different
agendas. As a result, international organizations will tend to develop
political and social goals that may diverge from those of its initial
masters (the States). There is a circular dynamic between the
spill-over of the power initially attributed to the WTO, which raises
the interest of social actors for political action in this institution,
and the reinforcement of the institution’s power precisely by virtue
of the political dynamic promoted by the action of those social
actors. This cycling dynamic promotes the overall power of the
WTO and its role as a global political arena. In the process, the
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control of social decision-making by traditional political processes
decreases. The WTO and the ILO are the best examples of
international institutions which, more than simply coordinating
States policies, promote independent political and social goals
which are determined by a constituency of social actors which goes
beyond the States and participates in manners different from those
occurring in domestic political processes. The consequence, of
constitutional relevance for social policy, is that the actors that
participate and dominate in this emerging global political arena are
not necessarily the same that have participated in the drafting of
public policies at the national and European level.
b) Changing the Domestic Patterns of Representation and Participation in
Social Policies
Even if we continue to link the determination of public policies at
the global level to an agreement among the more traditional
participants in the international community (States), the fact that
the State’s decisions will be decided in the framework of a different
State policy sphere means that representation and participation in
the drafting of those policies will change. The co-determination of
domestic policies at the international level means that many of the
State determinations of those policies are, at least in part, brought
into the realm of foreign or commercial policy. Once we accept that
the State does not have an homogeneous national interest and that
there are different mechanisms and forms of participation involved
in different areas of policy-making, one of the consequences of the
partial transfer of some policies into the realms of foreign and
commercial policies is that the relevant participants in the framing
of those policies change. Furthermore, international trade reduces
the power of the political processes by challenging their political
monopoly on the definition of the social good. This is so because
the emerging decision-making processes of international trade law
can be used by a group which lost a domestic political battle to
challenge the domestic political outcome. In effect, international
trade and economic integration, can be said to offer to some citizens
the option of exit with regard to the decisions of their political
community and in this sense challenge that political community
allocation of representation and participation.
International Trade and Constitutionalism: Friends or Enemies?
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c) The Transfer of Power to the Market
One of the consequences of the legal and economic processes of
regulatory competition arising from international trade is a reduction
in the political control over the economic sphere. Liberalisation of
trade generates competition among products and services of different
polities which, in turns, leads to a competition between the different
regulatory frameworks to which those products and services are
subject. Political communities have to determine their policies not
only on the basis of their internal preferences but also taking into
account the need for their products and services to be competitive in
the global market. The consequence is a transfer of power from
political processes to the global market. It is the market that will
choose between competing regulatory policies and, in this light, it
becomes crucial to assess the “constitutional quality” of representation
and participation in the market.
d) Technocratic Forms of Global Regulation
A similar process of transfer of power will occur if, instead of trusting
the regulation of international trade to the market, we decide to
subject it to international standards set by international technocratic
bodies. Both the markets and these technocratic bodies have an inherent
rationality and a set of normative values which is not subject to a
traditional form of political discourse or, to put it differently, they
“decide” on the basis of a community of participation and represen-
tation that is different from that of political processes.
Once we establish that international trade challenges both the constitu-
tional self-determination of the traditional political communities and
the variables of representation and participation in the tradional
constitutional framing of decision-making at the national level, the
impact of international trade on constitutionalism becomes clearer. As
a consequence, the relevant question becomes the forms of participation
and representation now available in the framing of social decision-
-making and how to continue to secure the civic solidarity and
constitutional self-determination necessary for different political
communities to survive. The transfer of power generated by interna-
tional trade to new forms of decision making such as the market,
international standard-setting institutions and supra-national judicial
bodies brings forward new problems of representation and partici-
Miguel Poiares Maduro
39
NAÇÃO
DEFESA
pation which highlight the remaining virtues of the State and other
traditional polities and the primordial role that they must continue to
play as the default form of representation and participation.
3 – INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AS AN EMERGING FORM OF
CONSTITUTIONALISM
From what has been said so far a question arises: when the powers of
international law challenge the conditions of participation and
representation at the constitutional level should that challenge not be
subject to constitutional regulation? It is here that the notion of a trans-
-national political connection emerges. In my view, where international
processes interfere in the constitutional self-determination of sub-global
political communities they must do so under a claim of legitimacy to be
found in constitutionalism itself. This justifies the creation of an inter-
national constitutional framework to assess the constitutional erosion of
the traditional political communities and manage the increased conflicts
between those different political communities constitutional claims. It is
this constitutional framework that will provide us with the imperfect
solution of our conundrum: how to protect the constitutional self-deter-
mination of competing political communities in the absence of a broader
global political community.
The emerging constitutional representations of international trade law
attempt to address this problem but they appear to underestimate the
value of traditional political communities and to ignore the importance
of the constitutional transformations brought by the new forms of
participation and representation which are available through the
current global processes of social decision-making. Many argue for the
need to subject these global processes to some form of democratic
control. In this light, there are those who propose far reaching models
of democratisation of the global community to be undertaken, for
example, through profound short and long-term reforms of the UN
system. There are also those which, in a more limited manner, defend
the creation of new institutional frameworks for the framing of global
standards which could reintroduce the previous balance of represen-
tation and participation in domestic policies. These are arguments
which depart from the need to move beyond local political communities
International Trade and Constitutionalism: Friends or Enemies?
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in the framing of public policies. In this view, the only way to
re-establish equality of power and representation in the deliberation
of those policies is by establishing institutional forms of political
dialogue at the international level.
There are also those who conceive the process of globalisation itself as
an instrument of constitutional development and trust to principles
such as free trade and non-discrimination the leading role in developing
such global or international constitutionalism. The World Trade
Organization and the agreements derived from the Uruguay Round
would be the primary tool of this perceived global constitutionalism.
The role of international trade law is that of guaranteeing the freedom
of individuals in the international arena so that they can fully enjoy
their personal autonomy. The way to promote global constitutionalism
would be by extending the scope and application of international
trade law, human rights documents and dispute-settlement
mechanisms. These will be the “avant-garde” of global constitutio-
nalism. The focus is then on a minimal notion of constitutionalism:
non-discrimination, individual rights (mainly economic rights) and
dispute-settlement mechanisms. The expectation is that these instances
will develop into a set of individual constitutional rights protected
from any form of power. The dynamics of international trade will fuel
the development of an international rule of law through these economic
rights and dispute-settlement mechanisms. Such dynamics will result
however in a particular form of constitutionalism. The conception
underlying such a constitutional construction of international trade
law will attribute to the latter the role of protecting economic freedom
in the global market and therefore will limit the capacity of the
different political processes to interfere with that freedom even when
pursuing what is perceived by those political processes as legitimate
social goals. Freedom in the global market would be expected to
generally be the best instrument for the promotion of constitutional
values. By founding both international trade law and domestic
constitutional law on the ideals of freedom and non-discrimination
one makes compatible the impact of international trade law on domestic
constitutional systems. In a way, international trade law is simply an
extension of national constitutional law. As we have seen, however,
this compatibility is hard to establish, since it implies a consensual
definition of what social rights are and how they are best to be
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balanced with free trade. It either conflicts with the existence of
different constitutional self-determinations by different political
communities or requires the global market to be raised to the status of
a global political community without an underlying political contract
supporting this criterion of legitimacy.
The set of rights which international trade law protects, its emerging
Rule of Law, the role which individuals and other Non-State actors
may be called to play in its development and its impact on the
domestic policies of States and other polities such as the EU, all
require international trade law to assume constitutional characteristics.
In my view, however, it is too early to talk of a global constitution or
to assume the existence of a global political community that could
justify the definition of social values beyond the independent social
self-determinations of different political communities. It is more
appropriate to talk of emerging elements of constitutionalism in the
international arena that must command the constitutional effects taking
place therein. There is no consensus on a social contract capable of
supporting a global form of constitutionalism. And there is no political
community to which one could make recourse to supplement that lack
of consensus. At the global level, the aim should be that of securing
equality of representation and participation in the exercise of the
different political communities constitutional self-determination.
Therefore, in my view, there are no global political conditions capable
of legitimising the exercise of such constituional self-determination at
the global level. On the other hand, as we have seen, the exercise of the
different political communities’ constitutional self-determination is
now clearly influenced by the forces of global economic integration.
This requires the setting up of constitutional modes of disciplining
such forces at the global level but only with the aim to secure the
conditions of representation and participation necessary to a legitimate
the exercise of constitutional self-determination at the level of the
local political communities (States or others, such as the EU).
There is no need and no possibility as yet of a global constitution but there
is a need of a constitutionalism that can embrace international law
in addressing the constitutional challenges generated by international
trade and, in the process, help correct current constitutional malfunctions
of the State. The departing point must still be the constitutional
self-determination of the traditional political communities but the new
International Trade and Constitutionalism: Friends or Enemies?
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forms of international law must develop normative criteria of participation
and representation and apply such criteria to the institutional choices
facing it. I want to end by challenging international lawyers to adopt such
constitutional perspective and take seriously the institutional choices
facing them.
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